The book was full of sketches in which Pugin juxtaposed the bland, utilitarian architecture of the 19th century with the intricate splendor of buildings built in medieval Europe. By any honest reckoning Pugin was being unfair. Rather, Pugin ended up launching what became known as the Gothic Revival. A civilization undergoing the most stupendous technological and social transformation since the adoption of agriculture would dress itself up in the form of a religious culture that had passed from the scene centuries before with the Reformation. I feel like we continue to engage in such nostalgic fantasies because a cartoon version of the past is so much easier to wrap our minds around than either the fractal present or the Stretch Armstrong of multiple, incompatible predictions regarding the future.
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The book was full of sketches in which Pugin juxtaposed the bland, utilitarian architecture of the 19th century with the intricate splendor of buildings built in medieval Europe. By any honest reckoning Pugin was being unfair. Rather, Pugin ended up launching what became known as the Gothic Revival. A civilization undergoing the most stupendous technological and social transformation since the adoption of agriculture would dress itself up in the form of a religious culture that had passed from the scene centuries before with the Reformation.
I feel like we continue to engage in such nostalgic fantasies because a cartoon version of the past is so much easier to wrap our minds around than either the fractal present or the Stretch Armstrong of multiple, incompatible predictions regarding the future.
There are many legitimate reasons to look to history, and I often do. The problem with our current fetish for the past is that we seem to be looking to it for whole social structures rather than as either a source of design and aesthetics or as object lesson in the eternal human capacity for both folly and resilience. For someone left-of-center, such as myself, these right-wing and fundamentalist versions of nostalgia are easy targets. But the left, along with some of the more communitarian elements on the right , has its own version of such nostalgia.
Hipster-like , it creates a vision of the future out of a nostalgaized version of the past. Instead, what I found was the latest version of Pugin, an attempt to leap over the dilemmas of the present through the imagining of a past that never was. But I am getting ahead of myself. To answer this question he cast his net wide into the origins of capitalism itself. For a happy couple of centuries before industrialism and the modern era the business landscape looked a little bit like Burning Man, the famous festival for digital artisans.
The bazaar was a peer-to-peer economy, something along the lines of e-bay or Etsy, where attention to human relationships and reputation promoted better business. The nobles had no way to keep up. They looked at this new phenomenon of wealth and wanted some for themselves…. This became the embedded value system of industrialism, and we see it in every aspect of the commercial landscape, then and now.
Think of the openness of the Internet when it first emerged as a new form of public space, or the enormous success and power of purely volunteer platforms like Wikipedia. Instead of a golden age of the peer-to-peer we got Uber. Rather than facilitate the horizontal distribution of wealth and power digital technologies have give rise to almost unprecedented degrees of inequality, surveillance and control.
Creating an economy in which human element is restored. What could anyone object to when it comes to that? Unfortunately, a lot.
Not only that, the industrial revolution would so undermine the nobility that today they barely exist except in a mummified form as a version of celebrity, however adorable. But rather than quibble over interpretations of the past, what about the more important question of the future? It certainly seems to be the case that the young of both the left and the right seem to favor a version of society and state as decentralized as possible.
I myself used to belong squarely in this camp. What convinced me otherwise was both the failure of the Occupy movement along with the broken promises of digital utopianism itself. We have yet to come to terms with these developments, and are very unlikely to find any way of coming to do so by looking to the Middle Ages. It is also the case that arguments for a peer-to-peer society seem oblivious to the kinds of infrastructure and expertise that go into any modern civilization.
Peer-to-peer networks are not going to provide our medical care, or build our roads and bridges, or even, despite leaps of the imagination, fight our wars. They will not prove to be the source of most scientific and technological breakthroughs, provide more than a minority of our manufactured goods, and probably could not, even if our diets were greatly reduced in quantity and variety, provide for our food.
Perhaps, peer-to-peer technologies and universal information will provide ways for non-experts to do things currently impossible for even the most dedicated groups of amateurs. Still, no one should assume all of these networks will be good citizens like Wikipedia, nor is it necessary that decisions and power in such groups will take an egalitarian form.
The very ad hoc nature of groups brought together by networking technology mean that power will likely become even more concentrated in those groups that cohere over longer periods of time: namely private and public bureaucracies such as multinational corporations or the NSA. Perhaps the unprecedented period of economic and technological growth that occurred over the last few centuries is indeed coming to a close. Though it might be the case that such forms of retrenchment are much less about collapse than the sign of civilizations capacity for adaptation and resilience, and even if such ages of retreat are much less barbaric than we imagine, the transition to them is often shocking and painful.
For before the artisanal cheese comes the darkness.
Pugin heeft vele kerken in Engeland ontworpen, en is onder meer verantwoordelijk voor het ontwerp van het interieur van het Palace of Westminster. Familie[ bewerken brontekst bewerken ] The Grange, het huis dat Pugin ontwierp voor zijn familie Augustus Pugin was de zoon van Augustus Charles Pugin , een Fransman die naar Engeland verhuisde tijdens de Franse Revolutie en trouwde met Catherine Welby uit Lincolnshire. In trouwde Pugin met Anne Garnet. Ze stierf een jaar later tijdens de bevalling van een dochter, die overleefde. Daarna trouwde hij met Louisa Burton, met wie hij zes kinderen kreeg. In bouwde Pugin een huis in Ramsgate voor zijn familie.
Augustus Welby Northmore Pugin
The northeast chapel of St. Through a contact made while working at Windsor, he became interested in the design of theatrical scenery, and in obtained a commission to design the sets for the production of the new opera Kenilworth at the Royal Opera House, Covent Garden. He had a further six children, including the architect Edward Welby Pugin , with his second wife, Louisa Burton, who died in Salisbury[ edit ] Following his second marriage in , Pugin moved to Salisbury , Wiltshire , with his wife,  and in bought half an acre of land in Alderbury , about one and a half miles outside the town. On this he built a Gothic Revival style house for his family, which he named St. Dissenters were also unable to serve on parish or city councils, be a member of Parliament, serve in the armed forces or on a jury.